error: static declaration of 'free_and_close_stuff' follows non-static declaration
Tiny whitespace cleanup while at it,
also make sure that we don't use CONFIG_ anymore.
Rob, hope this is ok w/ you..
be using WEXITSTATUS(), but until I can figure out why the heck that would
want to do (*(int *) &(status)) on the value, I'm happy just fixing the bug we
actually see.
0000474: vi crashes often
problem was that the buffer used for "." command ("last_modifying_cmd")
wasn't being maintined correctly -- the recording code was walking back
over the front of that buffer when a repeatable insert command
included backspacing (e.g. "i\b\b\bfoo"). the fix is to simply
record the backspaces along with the rest of the command.
also, cleaned up start_new_cmd_q() slightly.
correct screen, and bug 215 reports trouble with the status line
on small screens.
with this change a) the status line should always be refreshed
properly, b) the status line is a little shorter than it used to
be ("I" instead of "--INSERT--"), c) the status line will be
truncated if it doesn't fit on the screen, and d) if the screen
is too narrow for an error or transient status message (from
psb() or psbs()), then that message will be followed by a "Hit
Return" prompt. (it wasn't until i did this last bit that the
size grew. with this, these changes add about 150 bytes.)
- pgf
Charlie Brady wrote:
> Here's another awk parsing problem - unary post increment - pre is fine:
>
>bash-2.05a$ echo 2,3 | gawk -F , '{ $2++ }'
>bash-2.05a$ echo 2,3 | /tmp/busybox/busybox awk -F , '{ $2++ }'
>awk: cmd. line:1: Unexpected token
>
Here's a fix for this. There is another problem with constructions like
"print (A+B) ++C", I don't
know whether somebody uses such constructions (fixing both these
problems would require very
serious change in awk code).
This patch implements the 'T' command in sed. This is a GNU extension,
but one of the udev hotplug scripts uses it, so I need it in busybox
anyway.
Includes a test; 'svn add testsuite/sed/sed-branch-conditional-inverted'
after applying.
While the permissions on the temp file are correct to prevent it from being
maliciously mangled by passing strangers, (created with 600, opened O_EXCL,
etc), the permissions on the _directory_ might not be, and we re-open the
file to convert the filehandle to a FILE * (and automatically get an error
message and exit if the directory's read-only or out of space or some such).
This opens a potential race condition if somebody's using dnotify on the
directory, deletes/renames the tempfile, and drops a symlink or something
there. Somebody running sed -i as root in a world writeable directory could
do damage.
I dug up notes on an earlier discussion where we looked at the security
implications of this (unfortunately on the #uclibc channel rather than email;
I don't have a transcript, just notes-to-self) which pointed out that if the
permissions on the directory allow other people's files to be deleted/renamed
then the original file is vulnerable to sabotage anyway. However, there are
two cases that discussion apparently didn't take into account:
1) Using another user's permissions to damage files in other directories you
can't access (standard symlink attack).
2) Reading data another user couldn't otherwise access by having the new file
belong to that other user.
This patch uses fdopen to convert the filehandle into a FILE *, rather than
reopening the file.
