ndhc/src/sockd.h

#ifndef NDHC_SOCKD_H_
#define NDHC_SOCKD_H_

extern uid_t sockd_uid;
extern gid_t sockd_gid;
int request_sockd_fd(char buf[static 1], size_t buflen, char *response);
void sockd_main(void);

#endif /* NDHC_SOCKD_H_ */
Introduce a ndhc-sockd daemon that separates out the remaining elevated capabilities from the ndhc master process. Privsep is now complete. The only notable improvement from before is that exploitation of ndhc would only allow an attacker to open raw sockets, bind sockets to ports < port 1024, and create broadcast sockets on the interface that ndhc is performing dhcp on rather than on all interfaces. However, this seems like a worthwhile change; note that it was already impossible for an attacker to sniff packets on any interfaces (as that requires CAP_NET_ADMIN, which was always separated to ifch). 2014-04-04 13:42:25 +05:30			`#ifndef NDHC_SOCKD_H_`
			`#define NDHC_SOCKD_H_`

			`extern uid_t sockd_uid;`
			`extern gid_t sockd_gid;`
Indicate that client_state_t and client_config_t pointer args cannot ever be null. Could possibly improve code generation, and makes the intention clear. 2015-02-14 08:59:03 +05:30			`int request_sockd_fd(char buf[static 1], size_t buflen, char *response);`
Introduce a ndhc-sockd daemon that separates out the remaining elevated capabilities from the ndhc master process. Privsep is now complete. The only notable improvement from before is that exploitation of ndhc would only allow an attacker to open raw sockets, bind sockets to ports < port 1024, and create broadcast sockets on the interface that ndhc is performing dhcp on rather than on all interfaces. However, this seems like a worthwhile change; note that it was already impossible for an attacker to sniff packets on any interfaces (as that requires CAP_NET_ADMIN, which was always separated to ifch). 2014-04-04 13:42:25 +05:30			`void sockd_main(void);`

			`#endif /* NDHC_SOCKD_H_ */`