In production we've had several incidents over the years where a process
has a signal handler registered for SIGHUP or one of the SIGUSR signals
which can be used to signal a request to reload configs, rotate log
files, and the like. While this may seem harmless enough, what we've
seen happen repeatedly is something like the following:
1. A process is using SIGHUP/SIGUSR[12] to request some
application-handled state change -- reloading configs, rotating a log
file, etc;
2. This kind of request is deprecated and removed, so the signal handler
is removed. However, a site where the signal might be sent from is
missed (often logrotate or a service manager);
3. Because the default disposition of these signals is terminal, sooner
or later these applications are going to be sent SIGHUP or similar
and end up unexpectedly killed.
I know for a fact that we're not the only organisation experiencing
this: in general, signal use is pretty tricky to reason about and safely
remove because of the fairly aggressive SIG_DFL behaviour for some
common signals, especially for SIGHUP which has a particularly ambiguous
meaning. Especially in a large, highly interconnected codebase,
reasoning about signal interactions between system configuration and
applications can be highly complex, and it's inevitable that on occasion
a callsite will be missed.
In some cases the right call to avoid this will be to migrate services
towards other forms of IPC for this purpose, but inevitably there will
be some services which must continue using signals, so we need a safe
way to support them.
This patch adds support for the -H/--require-handler flag, which matches
on processes with a userspace handler present for the signal being sent.
With this flag we can enforce that all SIGHUP reload cases and SIGUSR
equivalents use --require-handler. This effectively mitigates the case
we've seen time and time again where SIGHUP is used to rotate log files
or reload configs, but the sending site is mistakenly left present after
the removal of signal handler, resulting in unintended termination of
the process.
Signed-off-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
The man page said it cannot show changes to comm, such as when you
use prctl(). In fact, ps can see this. The args field may not change
because its due to the path of the executable but comm can.
The field comm no longer shows defunct for zombie processes, use the
state field for this as it could be obscured if not the last
column anyhow.
Signed-off-by: Craig Small <csmall@dropbear.xyz>
This patch just supplements the previous series with a
few minor tweaks representing some diverse objectives:
. a recent date for man page (which i always overlook)
. improved length calculations to maximize graph width
. a proper response to platforms with less than 8 cpus
. more consistency and readability with one blank line
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
pgrep and friends naturally filter their own processes from their
matches. The same issue can occur when elevating with tools like sudo or
doas, where the elevating shim layers linger as a parent and are
returned in the results. For example:
% sudo pkill -9 -cf someelevatedcmdline
1
zsh: killed sudo pkill -9 -cf someelevatedcmdline
This is a situation we've actually seen in production, where some poor
soul changes how permission management works (for example with Linux's
hidepid option), needs to elevate a pgrep or pkill call, and now ends up
with more than they bargained for. Even after the issue is noticed,
resolving it requires reinventing some of the pgrep logic, which is
unfortunate.
This commit adds the -A/--ignore-ancestors option which excludes pgrep's
ancestors from the results:
% sudo ./pkill -9 -Acf someelevatedcmdline
0
We looks at multiple layers of the process hierarchy because, while
things like sudo only have one layer of shimming, some mechanisms (like
those found in a typical container manager like those found in Docker or
Kubernetes) may have many more.
Signed-off-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
