2013-01-22 14:50:07 +05:30
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/*
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2021-12-05 21:05:27 +05:30
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* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2013 Eric Biederman
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2013-01-22 14:50:07 +05:30
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*
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2021-12-05 21:05:27 +05:30
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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2013-01-22 14:50:07 +05:30
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*/
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#ifndef _IDMAPPING_H_
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#define _IDMAPPING_H_
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struct map_range {
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2013-08-13 22:58:07 +05:30
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unsigned long upper; /* first ID inside the namespace */
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unsigned long lower; /* first ID outside the namespace */
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unsigned long count; /* Length of the inside and outside ranges */
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2013-01-22 14:50:07 +05:30
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};
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extern struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv);
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extern void write_mapping(int proc_dir_fd, int ranges,
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new{g,u}idmap: align setuid and fscaps behavior
Commit 1ecca8439d5 ("new[ug]idmap: not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the parent userNS")
does contain a wrong commit message, is lacking an explanation of the
issue, misses some simplifications and hardening features. This commit
tries to rectify this.
In (crazy) environment where all capabilities are dropped from the
capability bounding set apart from CAP_SET{G,U}ID setuid- and
fscaps-based new{g,u}idmap binaries behave differently when writing
complex mappings for an unprivileged user:
1. newuidmap is setuid
unshare -U sleep infinity &
newuidmap $? 0 100000 65536
First file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) is hit. This calls into
cap_capable() and hits the loop
for (;;) {
/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
if (ns == cred->user_ns)
return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
/*
* If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for,
* we're done searching.
*/
if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level)
return -EPERM;
/*
* The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the
* user namespace has all caps.
*/
if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
return 0;
/*
* If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
* it over all children user namespaces as well.
*/
ns = ns->parent;
}
The first check fails and falls through to the end of the loop and
retrieves the parent user namespace and checks whether CAP_SYS_ADMIN is
available there which isn't.
2. newuidmap has CAP_SETUID as fscaps set
unshare -U sleep infinity &
newuidmap $? 0 100000 65536
The first file_ns_capable() check for CAP_SYS_ADMIN is passed since the
euid has not been changed:
if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
return 0;
Now new_idmap_permitted() is hit which calls ns_capable(ns->parent,
CAP_SET{G,U}ID). This check passes since CAP_SET{G,U}ID is available in
the parent user namespace.
Now file_ns_capable(file, ns->parent, CAP_SETUID) is hit and the
cap_capable() loop (see above) is entered again. This passes
if (ns == cred->user_ns)
return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
since CAP_SET{G,U}ID is available in the parent user namespace. Now the
mapping can be written.
There is no need for this descrepancy between setuid and fscaps based
new{g,u}idmap binaries. The solution is to do a
seteuid() back to the unprivileged uid and PR_SET_KEEPCAPS to keep
CAP_SET{G,U}ID. The seteuid() will cause the
file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) check to pass and the
PR_SET_KEEPCAPS for CAP_SET{G,U}ID will cause the CAP_SET{G,U}ID to
pass.
Fixes: 1ecca8439d5 ("new[ug]idmap: not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the parent userNS")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2018-10-27 21:53:50 +05:30
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struct map_range *mappings, const char *map_file, uid_t ruid);
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2013-01-22 14:50:07 +05:30
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#endif /* _ID_MAPPING_H_ */
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