shadow/src/gpasswd.c

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/*
* Copyright 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of Julianne F. Haugh nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY JULIE HAUGH AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL JULIE HAUGH OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include "defines.h"
#include "exitcodes.h"
#include "groupio.h"
#include "nscd.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
#include "sgroupio.h"
#endif
/*
* Global variables
*/
/* The name of this command, as it is invoked */
static char *Prog;
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
/* Indicate if shadow groups are enabled on the system
* (/etc/gshadow present) */
static int is_shadowgrp;
#endif
/* Flags set by options */
static int
aflg = 0, Aflg = 0, dflg = 0, Mflg = 0, rflg = 0, Rflg = 0;
/* The name of the group that is being affected */
static char *group = NULL;
/* The name of the user being added (-a) or removed (-d) from group */
static char *user = NULL;
/* The new list of members set with -M */
static char *members = NULL;
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
/* The new list of group administrators set with -A */
static char *admins = NULL;
#endif
/* The name of the caller */
static char *myname = NULL;
/* The UID of the caller */
static unsigned long bywho = -1;
/* Indicate if gpasswd was called by root */
#define amroot (0 == bywho)
/* The number of retries for th user to provide and repeat a new password */
#ifndef RETRIES
#define RETRIES 3
#endif
/* local function prototypes */
static void usage (void);
static RETSIGTYPE catch_signals (int killed);
static int check_list (const char *users);
static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv);
static void open_files (void);
static void close_files (void);
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
static void get_group (struct group *gr, struct sgrp *sg);
static void check_perms (const struct sgrp *sg);
static void update_group (struct group *gr, struct sgrp *sg);
static void change_passwd (struct group *gr, struct sgrp *sg);
#else
static void get_group (struct group *gr);
static void check_perms (const struct group *gr);
static void update_group (struct group *gr);
static void change_passwd (struct group *gr);
#endif
/*
* usage - display usage message
*/
static void usage (void)
{
fprintf (stderr, _("Usage: %s [-r|-R] group\n"), Prog);
fprintf (stderr, _(" %s [-a user] group\n"), Prog);
fprintf (stderr, _(" %s [-d user] group\n"), Prog);
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
fprintf (stderr,
_(" %s [-A user,...] [-M user,...] group\n"), Prog);
#else
fprintf (stderr, _(" %s [-M user,...] group\n"), Prog);
#endif
exit (E_USAGE);
}
/*
* catch_signals - set or reset termio modes.
*
* catch_signals() is called before processing begins. signal() is then
* called with catch_signals() as the signal handler. If signal later
* calls catch_signals() with a signal number, the terminal modes are
* then reset.
*/
static RETSIGTYPE catch_signals (int killed)
{
static TERMIO sgtty;
if (killed)
STTY (0, &sgtty);
else
GTTY (0, &sgtty);
if (killed) {
putchar ('\n');
fflush (stdout);
exit (killed);
}
}
/*
* check_list - check a comma-separated list of user names for validity
*
* check_list scans a comma-separated list of user names and checks
* that each listed name exists.
*/
static int check_list (const char *users)
{
const char *start, *end;
char username[32];
int errors = 0;
size_t len;
for (start = users; start && *start; start = end) {
if ((end = strchr (start, ','))) {
len = end - start;
end++;
} else {
len = strlen (start);
}
if (len > sizeof (username) - 1)
len = sizeof (username) - 1;
strncpy (username, start, len);
username[len] = '\0';
/*
* This user must exist.
*/
* lib/prototypes.h, configure.in, libmisc/Makefile.am, libmisc/xgetXXbyYY.c, libmisc/xgetpwnam.c, libmisc/xgetpwuid.c, libmisc/xgetgrnam.c, libmisc/xgetgrgid.c, libmisc/xgetspnam.c: Added functions xgetpwnam(), xgetpwuid(), xgetgrnam(), xgetgrgid(), and xgetspnam(). They allocate memory for the returned structure and are more robust to successive calls. They are implemented with the libc's getxxyyy_r() functions if available. * libmisc/limits.c, libmisc/entry.c, libmisc/chowntty.c, libmisc/addgrps.c, libmisc/myname.c, libmisc/rlogin.c, libmisc/pwdcheck.c, src/newgrp.c, src/login_nopam.c, src/userdel.c, src/lastlog.c, src/grpck.c, src/gpasswd.c, src/newusers.c, src/chpasswd.c, src/chfn.c, src/groupmems.c, src/usermod.c, src/expiry.c, src/groupdel.c, src/chgpasswd.c, src/su.c, src/useradd.c, src/groupmod.c, src/passwd.c, src/pwck.c, src/groupadd.c, src/chage.c, src/login.c, src/suauth.c, src/faillog.c, src/groups.c, src/chsh.c, src/id.c: Review all the usage of one of the getpwnam(), getpwuid(), getgrnam(), getgrgid(), and getspnam() functions. It was noticed on http://bugs.debian.org/341230 that chfn and chsh use a passwd structure after calling a pam function, which result in using information from the passwd structure requested by pam, not the original one. It is much easier to use the new xget... functions to avoid these issues. I've checked which call to the original get... functions could be left (reducing the scope of the structure if possible), and I've left comments to ease future reviews (e.g. /* local, no need for xgetpwnam */). Note: the getpwent/getgrent calls should probably be checked also. * src/groupdel.c, src/expiry.c: Fix typos in comments. * src/groupmod.c: Re-indent. * libmisc/Makefile.am, lib/groupmem.c, lib/groupio.c, lib/pwmem.c, lib/pwio.c, lib/shadowmem.c, lib/shadowio.c: Move the __<xx>_dup functions (used by the xget... functions) from the <xx>io.c files to the new <xx>mem.c files. This avoid linking some utils against the SELinux library.
2007-11-19 04:45:26 +05:30
if (!getpwnam (username)) { /* local, no need for xgetpwnam */
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: unknown user %s\n"),
Prog, username);
errors++;
}
}
return errors;
}
static void failure (void)
{
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: Permission denied.\n"), Prog);
exit (1);
}
/*
* process_flags - process the command line options and arguments
*/
static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
{
int flag;
while ((flag = getopt (argc, argv, "a:A:d:gM:rR")) != EOF) {
switch (flag) {
case 'a': /* add a user */
user = optarg;
* lib/prototypes.h, configure.in, libmisc/Makefile.am, libmisc/xgetXXbyYY.c, libmisc/xgetpwnam.c, libmisc/xgetpwuid.c, libmisc/xgetgrnam.c, libmisc/xgetgrgid.c, libmisc/xgetspnam.c: Added functions xgetpwnam(), xgetpwuid(), xgetgrnam(), xgetgrgid(), and xgetspnam(). They allocate memory for the returned structure and are more robust to successive calls. They are implemented with the libc's getxxyyy_r() functions if available. * libmisc/limits.c, libmisc/entry.c, libmisc/chowntty.c, libmisc/addgrps.c, libmisc/myname.c, libmisc/rlogin.c, libmisc/pwdcheck.c, src/newgrp.c, src/login_nopam.c, src/userdel.c, src/lastlog.c, src/grpck.c, src/gpasswd.c, src/newusers.c, src/chpasswd.c, src/chfn.c, src/groupmems.c, src/usermod.c, src/expiry.c, src/groupdel.c, src/chgpasswd.c, src/su.c, src/useradd.c, src/groupmod.c, src/passwd.c, src/pwck.c, src/groupadd.c, src/chage.c, src/login.c, src/suauth.c, src/faillog.c, src/groups.c, src/chsh.c, src/id.c: Review all the usage of one of the getpwnam(), getpwuid(), getgrnam(), getgrgid(), and getspnam() functions. It was noticed on http://bugs.debian.org/341230 that chfn and chsh use a passwd structure after calling a pam function, which result in using information from the passwd structure requested by pam, not the original one. It is much easier to use the new xget... functions to avoid these issues. I've checked which call to the original get... functions could be left (reducing the scope of the structure if possible), and I've left comments to ease future reviews (e.g. /* local, no need for xgetpwnam */). Note: the getpwent/getgrent calls should probably be checked also. * src/groupdel.c, src/expiry.c: Fix typos in comments. * src/groupmod.c: Re-indent. * libmisc/Makefile.am, lib/groupmem.c, lib/groupio.c, lib/pwmem.c, lib/pwio.c, lib/shadowmem.c, lib/shadowio.c: Move the __<xx>_dup functions (used by the xget... functions) from the <xx>io.c files to the new <xx>mem.c files. This avoid linking some utils against the SELinux library.
2007-11-19 04:45:26 +05:30
/* local, no need for xgetpwnam */
if (!getpwnam (user)) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: unknown user %s\n"), Prog,
user);
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"adding to group", user, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
aflg++;
break;
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
case 'A':
if (!amroot) {
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"Listing administrators", NULL,
bywho, 0);
#endif
failure ();
}
if (!is_shadowgrp) {
fprintf (stderr,
_
("%s: shadow group passwords required for -A\n"),
Prog);
exit (2);
}
admins = optarg;
if (check_list (admins))
exit (1);
Aflg++;
break;
#endif
case 'd': /* delete a user */
dflg++;
user = optarg;
break;
case 'g': /* no-op from normal password */
break;
case 'M':
if (!amroot) {
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"listing members", NULL, bywho,
0);
#endif
failure ();
}
members = optarg;
if (check_list (members))
exit (1);
Mflg++;
break;
case 'r': /* remove group password */
rflg++;
break;
case 'R': /* restrict group password */
Rflg++;
break;
default:
usage ();
}
}
}
/*
* open_files - lock and open the group databases
*
* It will call exit in case of error.
*/
static void open_files (void)
{
if (gr_lock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't get lock\n"), Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "failed to get lock for /etc/group"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"locking /etc/group", group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
if (is_shadowgrp && (sgr_lock () == 0)) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't get shadow lock\n"), Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "failed to get lock for /etc/gshadow"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"locking /etc/gshadow", group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
#endif
if (gr_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't open file\n"), Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open /etc/group"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"opening /etc/group", group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
if (is_shadowgrp && (sgr_open (O_RDWR) == 0)) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't open shadow file\n"), Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open /etc/gshadow"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"opening /etc/gshadow", group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
#endif
}
/*
* close_files - close and unlock the group databases
*
* This cause any changes in the databases to be committed.
*
* It will call exit in case of error.
*/
static void close_files (void)
{
if (gr_close () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't re-write file\n"), Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot re-write /etc/group"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"rewriting /etc/group", group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
if (is_shadowgrp && (sgr_close () == 0)) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't re-write shadow file\n"), Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot re-write /etc/gshadow"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"rewriting /etc/gshadow", group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
if (is_shadowgrp) {
/* TODO: same logging as in open_files & for /etc/group */
sgr_unlock ();
}
#endif
if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't unlock file\n"), Prog);
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"unlocking group file", group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
}
/*
* check_perms - check if the user is allowed to change the password of
* the specified group.
*
* It only returns if the user is allowed.
*/
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
static void check_perms (const struct sgrp *sg)
#else
static void check_perms (const struct group *gr)
#endif
{
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
/*
* The policy here for changing a group is that 1) you must be root
* or 2). you must be listed as an administrative member.
* Administrative members can do anything to a group that the root
* user can.
*/
if (!amroot && !is_on_list (sg->sg_adm, myname)) {
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"modify group", group, -1, 0);
#endif
failure ();
}
#else /* ! SHADOWGRP */
#ifdef FIRST_MEMBER_IS_ADMIN
/*
* The policy here for changing a group is that 1) you must bes root
* or 2) you must be the first listed member of the group. The
* first listed member of a group can do anything to that group that
* the root user can. The rationale for this hack is that the FIRST
* user is probably the most important user in this entire group.
*/
if (!amroot) {
if (gr->gr_mem[0] == (char *) 0) {
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"modifying group", group, -1, 0);
#endif
failure ();
}
if (strcmp (gr->gr_mem[0], myname) != 0) {
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"modifying group", myname, -1, 0);
#endif
failure ();
}
}
#else
/*
* This feature enabled by default could be a security problem when
* installed on existing systems where the first group member might
* be just a normal user. --marekm
*/
if (!amroot) {
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"modifying group", group, -1, 0);
#endif
failure ();
}
#endif
#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
}
/*
* update_group - Update the group information in the databases
*/
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
static void update_group (struct group *gr, struct sgrp *sg)
#else
static void update_group (struct group *gr)
#endif
{
if (!gr_update (gr)) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't update entry\n"), Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot update /etc/group"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"updating /etc/group", group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
if (is_shadowgrp && !sgr_update (sg)) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't update shadow entry\n"), Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot update /etc/gshadow"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"updating /etc/gshadow", group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
#endif
}
/*
* get_group - get the current information for the group
*
* The information are copied in group structure(s) so that they can be
* modified later.
*/
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
static void get_group (struct group *gr, struct sgrp *sg)
#else
static void get_group (struct group *gr)
#endif
{
struct group const*tmpgr = NULL;
struct sgrp const*tmpsg = NULL;
if (!gr_open (O_RDONLY)) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't open file\n"), Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open /etc/group"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"opening /etc/group", group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
if (!(tmpgr = gr_locate (group))) {
fprintf (stderr, _("unknown group: %s\n"), group);
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"group lookup", group, -1, 0);
#endif
failure ();
}
*gr = *tmpgr;
gr->gr_name = xstrdup (tmpgr->gr_name);
gr->gr_passwd = xstrdup (tmpgr->gr_passwd);
gr->gr_mem = dup_list (tmpgr->gr_mem);
if (!gr_close ()) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't close file\n"), Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot close /etc/group"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"closing /etc/group", group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
if (!sgr_open (O_RDONLY)) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't open shadow file\n"), Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open /etc/gshadow"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"opening /etc/gshadow", group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
if ((tmpsg = sgr_locate (group))) {
*sg = *tmpsg;
sg->sg_name = xstrdup (tmpsg->sg_name);
sg->sg_passwd = xstrdup (tmpsg->sg_passwd);
sg->sg_mem = dup_list (tmpsg->sg_mem);
sg->sg_adm = dup_list (tmpsg->sg_adm);
} else {
sg->sg_name = xstrdup (group);
sg->sg_passwd = gr->gr_passwd;
gr->gr_passwd = "!"; /* XXX warning: const */
sg->sg_mem = dup_list (gr->gr_mem);
sg->sg_adm = (char **) xmalloc (sizeof (char *) * 2);
#ifdef FIRST_MEMBER_IS_ADMIN
if (sg->sg_mem[0]) {
sg->sg_adm[0] = xstrdup (sg->sg_mem[0]);
sg->sg_adm[1] = 0;
} else
#endif
sg->sg_adm[0] = 0;
}
if (!sgr_close ()) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't close shadow file\n"), Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot close /etc/gshadow"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"closing /etc/gshadow", group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
}
/*
* change_passwd - change the group's password
*
* Get the new password from the user and update the password in the
* group's structure.
*
* It will call exit in case of error.
*/
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
static void change_passwd (struct group *gr, struct sgrp *sg)
#else
static void change_passwd (struct group *gr)
#endif
{
char *cp;
static char pass[BUFSIZ];
int retries;
/*
* A new password is to be entered and it must be encrypted, etc.
* The password will be prompted for twice, and both entries must be
* identical. There is no need to validate the old password since
* the invoker is either the group owner, or root.
*/
printf (_("Changing the password for group %s\n"), group);
for (retries = 0; retries < RETRIES; retries++) {
if (!(cp = getpass (_("New Password: "))))
exit (1);
STRFCPY (pass, cp);
strzero (cp);
if (!(cp = getpass (_("Re-enter new password: "))))
exit (1);
if (strcmp (pass, cp) == 0) {
strzero (cp);
break;
}
strzero (cp);
memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
if (retries + 1 < RETRIES) {
puts (_("They don't match; try again"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"changing password", group, -1, 0);
#endif
}
}
if (retries == RETRIES) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: Try again later\n"), Prog);
exit (1);
}
cp = pw_encrypt (pass, crypt_make_salt (NULL, NULL));
memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
if (is_shadowgrp)
sg->sg_passwd = cp;
else
#endif
gr->gr_passwd = cp;
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"changing password", group, -1, 1);
#endif
SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "change the password for group %s by %s", group,
myname));
}
/*
* gpasswd - administer the /etc/group file
*
* -a user add user to the named group
* -d user remove user from the named group
* -r remove password from the named group
* -R restrict access to the named group
* -A user,... make list of users the administrative users
* -M user,... make list of users the group members
*/
int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
struct group grent;
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
struct sgrp sgent;
#endif
struct passwd *pw = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_help_open ();
#endif
sanitize_env ();
setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain (PACKAGE);
/*
* Make a note of whether or not this command was invoked by root.
* This will be used to bypass certain checks later on. Also, set
* the real user ID to match the effective user ID. This will
* prevent the invoker from issuing signals which would interfer
* with this command.
*/
bywho = getuid ();
Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
OPENLOG ("gpasswd");
setbuf (stdout, NULL);
setbuf (stderr, NULL);
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
is_shadowgrp = sgr_file_present ();
#endif
/* Parse the options */
process_flags (argc, argv);
/*
* Make sure exclusive flags are exclusive
*/
if (aflg + dflg + rflg + Rflg + (Aflg || Mflg) > 1)
usage ();
/*
* Determine the name of the user that invoked this command. This
* is really hit or miss because there are so many ways that command
* can be executed and so many ways to trip up the routines that
* report the user name.
*/
pw = get_my_pwent ();
if (!pw) {
fprintf (stderr, _("Who are you?\n"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog, "user lookup", NULL,
bywho, 0);
#endif
failure ();
}
myname = xstrdup (pw->pw_name);
/*
* Get the name of the group that is being affected. The group entry
* will be completely replicated so it may be modified later on.
*/
if (!(group = argv[optind]))
usage ();
/*
* Replicate the group so it can be modified later on.
*/
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
get_group (&grent, &sgent);
#else
get_group (&grent);
#endif
/*
* Check if the user is allowed to change the password of this group.
*/
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
check_perms (&sgent);
#else
check_perms (&grent);
#endif
/*
* Removing a password is straight forward. Just set the password
* field to a "".
*/
if (rflg) {
grent.gr_passwd = ""; /* XXX warning: const */
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
sgent.sg_passwd = ""; /* XXX warning: const */
#endif
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"deleting group password", group, -1, 1);
#endif
SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "remove password from group %s by %s",
group, myname));
goto output;
} else if (Rflg) {
/*
* Same thing for restricting the group. Set the password
* field to "!".
*/
grent.gr_passwd = "!"; /* XXX warning: const */
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
sgent.sg_passwd = "!"; /* XXX warning: const */
#endif
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"restrict access to group", group, -1, 1);
#endif
SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "restrict access to group %s by %s",
group, myname));
goto output;
}
/*
* Adding a member to a member list is pretty straightforward as
* well. Call the appropriate routine and split.
*/
if (aflg) {
printf (_("Adding user %s to group %s\n"), user, group);
grent.gr_mem = add_list (grent.gr_mem, user);
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
sgent.sg_mem = add_list (sgent.sg_mem, user);
#endif
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog, "adding group member",
user, -1, 1);
#endif
SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "add member %s to group %s by %s", user,
group, myname));
goto output;
}
/*
* Removing a member from the member list is the same deal as adding
* one, except the routine is different.
*/
if (dflg) {
int removed = 0;
printf (_("Removing user %s from group %s\n"), user, group);
if (is_on_list (grent.gr_mem, user)) {
removed = 1;
grent.gr_mem = del_list (grent.gr_mem, user);
}
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
if (is_on_list (sgent.sg_mem, user)) {
removed = 1;
sgent.sg_mem = del_list (sgent.sg_mem, user);
}
#endif
if (!removed) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: unknown member %s\n"),
Prog, user);
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"deleting member", user, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog, "deleting member",
user, -1, 1);
#endif
SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "remove member %s from group %s by %s",
user, group, myname));
goto output;
}
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
/*
* Replacing the entire list of administators is simple. Check the
* list to make sure everyone is a real user. Then slap the new list
* in place.
*/
if (Aflg) {
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog, "setting group admin",
group, -1, 1);
#endif
SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "set administrators of %s to %s",
group, admins));
sgent.sg_adm = comma_to_list (admins);
if (!Mflg)
goto output;
}
#endif
/*
* Replacing the entire list of members is simple. Check the list to
* make sure everyone is a real user. Then slap the new list in
* place.
*/
if (Mflg) {
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
"setting group members", group, -1, 1);
#endif
SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "set members of %s to %s", group, members));
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
sgent.sg_mem = comma_to_list (members);
#endif
grent.gr_mem = comma_to_list (members);
goto output;
}
/*
* If the password is being changed, the input and output must both
* be a tty. The typical keyboard signals are caught so the termio
* modes can be restored.
*/
if (!isatty (0) || !isatty (1)) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: Not a tty\n"), Prog);
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog, "changing password",
group, -1, 0);
#endif
exit (1);
}
catch_signals (0); /* save tty modes */
signal (SIGHUP, catch_signals);
signal (SIGINT, catch_signals);
signal (SIGQUIT, catch_signals);
signal (SIGTERM, catch_signals);
#ifdef SIGTSTP
signal (SIGTSTP, catch_signals);
#endif
/* Prompt for the new password */
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
change_passwd (&grent, &sgent);
#else
change_passwd (&grent);
#endif
/*
* This is the common arrival point to output the new group file.
* The freshly crafted entry is in allocated space. The group file
* will be locked and opened for writing. The new entry will be
* output, etc.
*/
output:
if (setuid (0)) {
fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot change ID to root.\n"));
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "can't setuid(0)"));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog, "changing id to root",
group, -1, 0);
#endif
closelog ();
exit (1);
}
pwd_init ();
open_files ();
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
update_group (&grent, &sgent);
#else
update_group (&grent);
#endif
close_files ();
nscd_flush_cache ("group");
exit (E_SUCCESS);
}