On failure, these are meant to return 0 with errno set. But if
an nss module is loaded, they were returning -ERRNO instead.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
- Don't else after return or fail_exit().
- Prefer == over != (negated logic is more complex to think about it).
- Reduce nesting when reasonable.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
There's no reason to report all errors. Bail out at the first one,
which is simpler.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Some errors were being reported in stderr, but then they weren't really
being treated as errors.
If mkdir(2) for EEXIST, it's possible that the sysadmin pre-created the
user dir; don't fail. However, let's keep a log line, for having some
notice that it happened.
Also, run chmod(2) if mkdir(2) failed for EEXIST (so transform the
'else if' into an 'if').
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
OpenSSH and coreutils' chroot call chroot first and then chdir. Doing it
this way is a bit safer because otherwise something could happen between
chdir and chroot to the specified path (like exchange of links) so the
working directory would not end up within the chroot environment.
This is a purely defensive measure.
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
This is no real world security fix.
The overflow could occur if too many layered subsystems are encountered
because the function check_perms calls itself recursively.
It would already take a misconfigured system for this to achieve it.
Use an iterative approach by calling the do_check_perms in a loop
instead of calling itself recursively.
As a side note: At least GCC 13 optimized this code and already uses
a jmp in its assembler code. I could only see the stack overflow by
activating address sanitizer which prevented the optimization.
Co-developed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
If a user has home directory "/" and login shell "*" then login and su
enter an endless loop by constantly switching to the next subsystem.
This could also be achieved with a layered approach so just checking
for "/" as home directory is not enough to protect against such a
misconfiguration.
Just break the loop if it progressed too far. I doubt that this has
negative impact on any real setup.
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
If econf_getStringValue() fails, it will return an error and
set value to NULL. Look for the error and avoid dereferencing
value in that case.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
The function is completely different based on USE_CONF. Either copy
will be easier to read if we just keep them completely separate.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
You can see the memory leaks with address sanitizer if shadow is
compiled with `--enable-vendordir=/usr/etc`.
How to reproduce:
1. Prepare a custom shell file as root
```
mkdir -p /etc/shells.d
echo /bin/myshell > /etc/shells.d/custom
```
2. Run chsh as regular user
```
chsh
```
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
The getusershell implementation of musl returns every line within the
/etc/shells file, which even includes comments. Only consider absolute
paths for login shells.
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
Using --prefix in a setuid binary is quite dangerous. An unprivileged
user could prepare a custom shadow file in home directory. During a data
race the user could exchange directories with links which could lead to
exchange of shadow file in system's /etc directory.
This could be used for local privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
Please find attached the french updated translation of shadow-man-page,
proofread by the debian-l10n-french mailing list contributors.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
Neither a pid_t below 1 nor a negative fd could be valid in this context.
Proof of Concept:
$ newuidmap -1 1 1 1
newuidmap: Could not open proc directory for target 4294967295
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
Some strings are first written into static char arrays before passed to
functions which expect a const char pointer anyway.
It is easier to pass these strings directly as arguments.
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
its by default does not support xml tags inside translatable
units. Use custom its rules from
https://www.w3.org/TR/xml-i18n-bp/#relating-docbook-plus-its
to enable the tags which are in use by docbook.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
The fcntl call to set FD_CLOEXEC can be performed directly with the
previously performed open call by using the O_CLOEXEC flag.
O_CLOEXEC is required by POSIX.1-2008.
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
The only user of login_prompt is the login tool. This implies that the
first argument is always the same.
It is much easier to verify printf's format string and its argument if
both are next to each other.
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
Parsing optional environment variables after a login name is a feature
which is neither documented nor available in util-linux or busybox
login which are other wide spread login utilities used in Linux
distributions as reference.
Removing this feature resolves two issues:
- A memory leak exists if variables without an equal sign are used,
because set_env creates copies on its own. This could lead to OOM
situations in privileged part of login or may lead to heap spraying.
- Environment variables are not reset between login attempts. This
could lead to additional environment variables set for a user who
never intended to do so.
Proof of Concept on a system with shadow login without PAM and
util-linux agetty:
1. Provoke an invalid login, e.g. user `noone` and password `invalid`.
This starts shadow login and subsequent inputs are passed through
the function login_prompt.
2. Provoke an invalid login with environment variables, e.g.
user `noone HISTFILE=/tmp/owo` and password `invalid`.
3. Log in correctly with user `root`.
Now you can see with `echo $HISTFILE` that `/tmp/owo` has been set for
the root user.
This requires a malicious failed login attempt and a successful login
within the configured login timeout (default 60 seconds).
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
The getline function does not return a pointer but the amount of read
characters. The error return value to check for is -1.
Set buf to NULL to avoid dereference of an uninitialized stack value.
The getline function returns -1 if size argument is NULL. Always use
a valid pointer even if size is unimportant.
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
Add the relevant XKCD to the passwd(1) manual page. It already explains
most of the rationale behind this patch.
Add also reference to makepasswd(1), which is a good way to generate
strong passwords. Personally, I commonly run `makepasswd --chars 64` to
create my passwords, or 32 for passwords I need to type interactively
often.
The strength of a password is an exponential formula, where the base is
the size of the character set, and the exponent is the length of the
password. That already shows why long passwords of just lowercase
letters are better than short Pa$sw0rdZ3. But an even more important
point is that humans, when forced to use symbols in a password, are more
likely to do trivial substitutions on simple passwords, which doesn't
increase strength, and can instead give a false sense of strength, which
is dangerous.
Closes: <https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues/688>
Link: <https://xkcd.com/936/>
Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Destroying the handle does not actually disconnect, see [1].
Also free the key on user removal.
[1]: e9072e7d45/libsemanage/src/direct_api.c (L330)
Example adduser leak:
Direct leak of 1008 byte(s) in 14 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5638f2e782ae in __interceptor_malloc (./src/useradd+0xee2ae)
#1 0x7fb5cfffad09 in dbase_file_init src/database_file.c:170:45
Direct leak of 392 byte(s) in 7 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5638f2e782ae in __interceptor_malloc (./src/useradd+0xee2ae)
#1 0x7fb5cfffc929 in dbase_policydb_init src/database_policydb.c:187:27
Direct leak of 144 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5638f2e782ae in __interceptor_malloc (./src/useradd+0xee2ae)
#1 0x7fb5cfffb519 in dbase_join_init src/database_join.c:249:28
[...]
Free the actual struct of the removed entry.
Example userdel report:
Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x55b230efe857 in reallocarray (./src/userdel+0xda857)
#1 0x55b230f6041f in mallocarray ./lib/./alloc.h:97:9
#2 0x55b230f6041f in commonio_open ./lib/commonio.c:563:7
#3 0x55b230f39098 in open_files ./src/userdel.c:555:6
#4 0x55b230f39098 in main ./src/userdel.c:1189:2
#5 0x7f9b48c64189 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
run_parts currently exists in useradd and userdel, this commit mirrors
the functionality with groupadd and groupdel
Hook for group{add,del} to include killing processes that have group
membership that would no longer exist to avoid membership ID reuse.
getline(3) is much more readable than manually looping. It has some
overhead due to the allocation of a buffer, but that shouldn't be a
problem here. If that was a problem, we could reuse the buffer (thus
making the function non-reentrant), but I don't think that's worth the
extra complexity.
Using rpmatch(3) instead of a simple y/n test provides i18n to the
response checking. We have a fall-back minimalistic implementation for
systems that lack this function (e.g., musl libc).
While we're at it, apply some other minor improvements to this file:
- Remove comment saying which files use this function. That's likely
to get outdated. And anyway, it's just a grep(1) away, so it doesn't
really add any value.
- Remove unnecessary casts to (void) that were used to verbosely ignore
errors from stdio calls. They add clutter without really adding much
value to the code (or I don't see it).
- Remove comments from the function body. They make the function less
readable. Instead, centralize the description of the function into a
man-page-like comment before the function definition. This keeps the
function body short and sweet.
- Add '#include <stdbool.h>', which was missing.
- Minor whitespace style changes (it doesn't hurt the diff at this
point, since most of the affected lines were already touched by other
changes, so I applied my preferred style :).
Acked-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
The tools newgrp and useradd expect waitpid to behave as described in
its manual page. But the notes indicate that if SIGCHLD is ignored,
waitpid behaves differently.
A user could set SIGCHLD to ignore before starting newgrp through exec.
Children of newgrp would not become zombies and their PIDs could be
reassigned before newgrp could call kill with the child pid and SIGCONT.
The useradd tool is not installed setuid, but I have added the default
there as well (copied from vipw).
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
Do not stop after 79 characters. Read the complete line to avoid
arbitrary limitations.
Proof of Concept:
```
cat > passwd-poc << EOF
root❌0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
root❌0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
root❌0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
EOF
python -c "print(80*'y')" | pwck passwd-poc
```
Two lines should still be within the file because we agreed only once
to remove a duplicated line.
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
If make fails in a multi-process invocation, the log is pretty much
unreadable. To make it readable, build as much as can be built without
failing. Then run a single-process make again. If we succeeded
previously, this should be a no-op. If not, this run will stop at the
first error, which should be more readable, and will only print the few
lines we're interested in.
This has some side effects: Now we build as much as we can, instead of
failing as early as possible; this may make CI a bit slower. However,
it also has the benefit that you see _all_ the error messages that could
be given, instead of needing to fix the first error to see the next and
so on.
Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
libbsd-devel libeconf-devel have already been added to the spec file and
they should be installed by the `dnf builddep` command.
Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
e5905c4b ("Added control character check") introduced checking for
control characters but had the logic inverted, so it rejects all
characters that are not control ones.
Cast the character to `unsigned char` before passing to the character
checking functions to avoid UB.
Use strpbrk(3) for the illegal character test and return early.
